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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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National Intelligence Council

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry S. Rowen
Chairman, National Intelligence Council


FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr.
, National Intelligence Officer at Large

SUBJECT : Possible Future Contingencies

Charley Waterman and my other regional NIO colleagues have the world of disaster at their fingertips. We are not so fortunate. In the nuclear proliferation sphere, we are constantly focused on unpleasant contingencies and therefore we must strain a bit to find a set of credible scenarios. Here are a few illustrative items, but I am not sure they have much sex appeal. I am therefore passing them to you first before they qualify for the DCI:

- Significant expansion of PRC nuclear exports to countries of proliferation concern (India, Argentina, Brazil). What would be the effect on (a) the coordination of exports among nuclear supplier states, (b) US-PRC relations, and (c) the global nonproliferation regime?
- Enlarged French involvement in South Africa's nuclear program to include the provision of additional nuclear power reactors (strong rumors to that effect are in the current press). This would further weaken the leverage of nuclear supplier states on South Africa to become a party to the NPT and accept full-scope safeguards.
- US re-entry into the IAEA is thwarted by Congressional funding constraints and a UNGA resolution threatening Israeli membership. (Both of these events have already occurred but are probably reversible.) If there are not reversed, what would be the effect of these developments on US nonproliferation policy and on the promising beginning of a US-Soviet bilateral nonproliferation dialogue?

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- Key Pakistani facilities are destroyed by Indian and/or Israeli attack. What political and military consequences would ensue for Indian relations with Islamic countries, the USSR, China, and the US? What might be the consequences of a Pakistani retaliatory strike against Indian facilities? (The ongoing SNIE on "Indian Reactions to a Pakistani Weapons Capability" deals principally with the reaction options open to India, not with the larger political-military consequences of a strike.)

If any of these appeal to you, we are prepared to develop our speculative thoughts on them.



Hans Heymann, Jr.